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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto-an individual or group of individuals]-
released a paper that described Bitcoin, a first of its kind, peer-to-peer elec-
tronic cash system. 2 Bitcoin relies mostly on existing technology but requires
a new invention, a blockchain, to solve an old problem: how do two parties
conduct an online transaction without knowing or trusting each other and
without the need for a trusted third-party intermediary?3 Encryption and
large-scale redundancy was combined with Nakamoto's blockchain to solve
this problem for the first time-the Bitcoin blockchain is the key.4
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1. See, e.g., Elle Hunt et al., Bitcoin Creator Satoshi Nakamoto Probably Austra-
lian Entrepreneur, Reports Claim, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.
theguardian.com/technology/2015/dec/09/bitcoin-creator-satoshi-nakamoto-al-
leged-to-be-australian-academic; Emin Gin Sirer, How to Spot Bitcoin Inven-
tor Satoshi Nakamoto, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.technolo
gyreview.com/s/544431/how-to-spot-bitcoin-inventor-satoshi-nakamoto/ (dis-
cussing the true identity of Nakamoto). Recently, Craig Wright has claimed to
be Satoshi Nakamoto, but skepticism over his remarks remain. See, e.g., Craig
Steven Wright Claims to be Satoshi Nakamoto. Is He?, THE ECONOMIST (May
2, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/briefings/21698061-craig-steven-
wright-claims-be-satoshi-nakamoto-bitcoin; Craig Wright's Claims to be
Satoshi Nakamoto Come Under Fire, THE ECONOMIST (May 2, 2016), http://
www.economist.com/news/briefings/21698066-onus-on-craig-wright-provide-
better-evidence-satoshi-nakamoto.
2. SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM
(2008), https:/Ibitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Id. (The article summarizes the process through 6 steps: (1) broadcasting the
information to the network; (2) each node in the network compiles the informa-
tion; (3) each node checks the information by solving a complicated process;
(4) each node broadcast the proof that it solved the checking process; (5) the
nodes accept the broadcast only if the information included is proven to be
correct; and (6) the nodes add to the chain the new information, where it is,
timestamp, and its location in the chain is contingent on the previous elements
of the chain.).
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Blockchains are permanently distributed spreadsheets or ledgers where
information can only be added-never deleted.5 The spreadsheet is not in-
and-of-itself a novel technology, but blockchain's decentralized attribute and
permanency, 6 combined with its incorruptibility (or quasi incorruptibility),7
makes its applications potentially disruptive.8 As with most technologies,
blockchain technology has several advantages but also significant drawbacks.
When considering a switch to this new technology, decision makers need to
perform a complicated cost-benefit analysis.
Bitcoin, the blockchain's first application, has been described by some
as a virtual currency. 9 Following Bitcoin's lead, the financial industry is now
at the forefront of taking blockchain technology mainstream, but likely for
different motivations.o Banks may have different motivations for taking this
technology forward. Some banks may feel threatenedi because blockchain
technology can offer a cheaper alternative to traditional banking and can
5. Id.
6. Primavera De Filippi & Aaron Wright, Decentralized Blockchain Technology
and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia (Mar. 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2580664 (describing the process through which
blocks are permanently added to the chain in a decentralized manner).
7. The Bitcoin whitepaper describes the likeliness of an attack. NAKAMOTO, supra
note 2. These attacks have been known as "51% attacks" because they require
the attacker to gain control of 51% of the total mining hash rate. Danny Brad-
bury, The Problem with Bitcoin, 11 COMPUTER FRAUD & SECURITY 5 (2013).
8. Bradbury, supra note 7.
9. The debate over whether bitcoins qualify as a currency or asset has been inves-
tigated by policymakers around the world. See, e.g., Robleh Ali et al., Innova-
tions in Payment Technologies and the Emergence of Digital Currencies, BANK
OF ENG. Q. BULL. Q3 (2014), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/
Pages/quarterlybulletin/2014/qbl4q3.aspx; Virtual Currency Schemes a Fur-
ther Analysis, EUR. CENT. BANK (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemesen.pdf; Dong He et al., Virtual Curren-
cies and Beyond: Initial Considerations, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Jan. 20,
2016), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=43618.
10. Banks have taken the lead in developing commercial applications of blockchain
technology. Forty-two banks (including UBS, Goldman Sachs, and JP Morgan)
have invested into a start-up (R3 CEV) that is developing a standardized archi-
tecture for private ledgers. Nathaniel Popper, Funds Roll In for Start-Up Har-
nessing Bitcoin Tech, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/01/22/business/funds-roll-in-for-start-up-harnessing-bitcoin-tech.html.
11. See, e.g., Cade Metz, Why Wall Street Is Embracing the Blockchain-Its Big-
gest Threat, WIRED (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.wired.com/2016/02/wall-street
-is-embracing-the-blockchain-its-biggest-threat/; Arjun Kharpal & Julia Chat-





reach portions of the population without access to banks.12 Thus, some of
these banks may be trying to preempt the very tool that could doom their
future. Some banks may also consider quasi-centralized applications of this
technology to represent its best use.1 3 Under a quasi-centralized blockchain
system, banks and financial institutions envision an opportunity to cooperate
and create a common system based on a know-your-consumer business
model to take advantage of blockchain technology while satisfying regula-
tory requirements and ameliorating its drawbacks.
The information recorded on blockchains can, however, go beyond cur-
rency and its transfers. Blockchain applications have grown substantially in
recent years. 14 Recent projects look to provide services that are traditionally
provided by public entities.is For instance, in Estonia, the government has
teamed up with a private company (Bitnation) to provide e-residency and
notarization services through a blockchain.16 Some other applications of this
potentially disruptive technology are discussed below.
Blockchain technology comes with its own challenges. This article dis-
cusses the policy challenges that will be presented if blockchain technology
becomes widely adopted. The policy ecosystem is not fully adapted to this
technology, and rules and regulations would have to be retrofitted. This arti-
cle first discusses issues presented by public blockchains, best analogized as
a permanent public ledger. Specifically, privacy breaches and copyright in-
fringement may increase if data recording moves from the current centralized
systems to a distributed blockchain system.
12. Brett Scott, How Can Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Technology Play a Role
in Building Social and Solidarity Finance?, UNITED NATIONS RES. INST. FOR
Soc. DEv. (2016), http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3CO05BCCF9/search/196AE
F663B617144Cl 257F550057887C?.
13. These banks form a consortium with the objective of implementing a private
blockchain this year. Kim S. Nash, Blockchain: Catalyst for Massive Change
Across Industries, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/
02/02/blockchain-catalyst-for-massive-change-across-industries/. Other banks
partnered (e.g., BNP Paribas, Citigroup, etc.) have invested. in blockchain
projects targeting, among other things, stocks, derivatives, and loans. Another
financial institution alliance (involving Visa, Inc., Nasdaq, etc.) is also backing
their own project. Bank of America has already filed numerous patents on
Blockchain technology. Arjun Kharpal & Julia Chatterley, Bank of America is
Going Big on Blockchain, CNBC (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/
01/28/bank-of-america-is-going-big-on-blockchain-plans-to-file-20-patents.
html.
14. Nash, supra note 13.
15. Ian Allison, Bitnation and Estonian Government Start Spreading Sovereign Ju-
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The article then discusses the drawbacks of private blockchains. Private
blockchains can be implemented in different ways, but current implementa-
tions require special equipment that could stifle wide-scale adoption due to
the associated switching and operating costs. Furthermore, blockchain algo-
rithms provide no mechanism to correct erroneous recordings within the
blockchain. As such, the benefits of blockchain technology may currently be
outweighed by drawbacks. This article narrowly considers governmental im-
plementations, but these issues apply to all blockchains.
Finally, this article offers a counter-argument in favor of public entities
adopting blockchain technology. The secure nature of this technology allows
for easier and broader publication of government data, which could help
transparency goals. Furthermore, the mathematical algorithms used in
blockchain implementations assure the accuracy and legitimacy of the infor-
mation stored within. This article is written from the perspective of United
States and European Union policymakers, but the arguments within can be
further generalized.
II. THE EXPANSION OF PUBLIC BLOCKCHAINS
CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO PRIVACY AND COPYRIGHT
Publicly accessible blockchains resemble the current Internet, allowing
anyone to view the data.17 Bitcoin, for example, allows anyone with internet
access to view the entire transaction history of every bitcoin in existence.18
Recording any property transactions (real, intellectual, or intangible) could
offer the same benefits.
A public blockchain makes the recorded information readily available
and decreases some transaction costs.1 9 For instance, if patent ownership was
recorded on a blockchain at the national patent office, a technology imple-
menter could locate a patent right holder in order to purchase or license the
patent rights. However, such a blockchain with public access has significant
drawbacks. This section discusses the policy issues presented by a publicly
accessible blockchain where everyone can read and write on the blockchain.
A. Privacy
Public blockchains jeopardize information privacy because of two in-
herent characteristics. First, blockchain technology relies on an append-only
17. See generally Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market In-
frastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 837, 843-44 (2015) (discussing Bitcoin and its operation using
blockchain technology).
18. See id.
19. See The Great Chain of Being Sure About Things, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 31,
2015), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21677228-technology-behind-
bitcoin-lets-people-who-do-not-know-or-trust-each-other-build-dependable
[hereinafter The Great Chain].
[Vol. XIX330
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data process; as such, no information can be removed.20 Second, public
blockchains rely on a distributed data storage system where their entire node
network records the same information; accordingly, any change requires
practically the entire network to agree on the change.21 Removing informa-
tion becomes difficult-if not impossible-in blockchains with well-distrib-
uted networks.22
Controlling information uploaded to a public blockchain is a central is-
sue. If a user uploads sensitive or private information, policymakers who
attempt to enforce or encourage privacy may find no way of ameliorating the
damage.23 In the Internet age, privacy has already become a concern. 24 The
European Commission and the United States have had different responses to
similar issues.
In Europe, policymakers recognized a right-to-be-forgotten in 1995,25
which entitles European citizens to request the removal of their personal in-
formation from searchable internet data stores. 26 The intent and scope of this
directive has been defined and reaffirmed by the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) in 2014 in Google v. Agencia Espadiola de Proteccidn de Datos
(AEDP).27
20. See generally Katherine Heines, The Risks and Rewards of Blockchain Tech-
nology, 63 RISK MANAGEMENT 4, 6-7 (Mar. 1, 2016) (discussing blockchain
technology and its functionality between various network users).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 IND.
L.J. 881 (2013) (discussing the different concepts of privacy and comparing the
U.S. and EU approach to privacy).
24. Consumers are often unaware how their information is collected and used. See
Jai-Yeol Son & Sung S. Kim, Internet Users' Information Privacy-Protective
Responses: A Taxonomy and a Nomological Model, 32 MIS Q. 503, 506
(2008), http://www.jstor.org/stable/25148854 (analyzing different information
privacy responses once internet users are made aware how their information is
used, including not engaging, removing already disclosed information, com-
plaining, spreading negative publicity, etc.).
25. See generally Council Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 12,
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42 (establishing the right of an individual to ask for
personal data which is incomplete or inaccurate to be deleted).
26. See generally Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REv.
ONLINE 88, 92 (2012) (discussing the right to be forgotten and how it will be
implemented and criticizing its impact on public speech).
27. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de
Datos (AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317, at *21.
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In Google v. AEDP, a Spanish citizen complained to a search engine,
Google, and a newspaper, La Vanguardia, that when his name was inputted
into the Google search engine, a negative 1998 La Vanguardia newspaper
story about the man appeared.28 AEDP, the regulating agency, rejected the
complaint with regard to the newspaper, because at the time of publishing the
information was free speech protected news; AEDP, however, affirmed the
complaint with regard to Google because search results amounted to a pro-
vider of content.29 Google appealed the administrative ruling and the case
was referred to the highest European court. 30 The ECJ found that search en-
gines process and present information and, therefore, fall under the authority
of AEDP as a content provider.31 Under the directive, search engines are
controllers of information.32 The Court balanced the interest of free speech
against the right to privacy,33 but this delicate balance remains case spe-
cific.34 The Court ruled that upon a request from an individual, a name-based
search might, under certain circumstances (e.g., a lengthy passage of time),
warrant enjoining the return of a link to information stored by a third party. 35
In other words, what is secondary content in some contexts can be primary
content in others, and citizens have a right to control some primary personal
content-the right to be forgotten.3 6
The introduction of a public blockchain could complicate how to imple-
ment the right-to-be-forgotten.37 In a centralized system, a judge can demand
that the central server remove the unwanted information.38 But in a decentral-
ized system, multiple nodes carry identical copies of the same information-
nodes that may not even be within a court's jurisdiction.39 Enforcing a re-
28. Id. ¶ 14.
29. Id. ¶¶ 15-16.
30. See id. 11 18-20.
31. See id. ¶ 30.
32. See id. ¶ 38.
33. See Google Spain SL, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at 1 74.
34. See id. ¶ 81.
35. See id. ¶¶ 88, 99.
36. Google evaluates about 572 requests a day and grants about half of them. In
spite of the processing volume, the Google process has been criticized for its
opacity; and the policymakers have been criticized for leaving Google to adju-
dicate the right to be forgotten requests. See Mark Scott, Europe Tried to Rein
In Google. It Backfired, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/04/19/technology/google-europe-privacy-watchdog.html.
37. See Jeni Tennison, What is the Impact of Blockchains on Privacy?, THE OPEN






moval order becomes complicated, if not impossible.40 If unwanted informa-
tion is placed on a public blockchain, the blockchain's immutable design
may require the information to remain.41
In the United States, some of the privacy debate revolves around "re-
venge porn."42 Revenge porn refers to the nonconsensual distribution of me-
dia depicting consensual intimacy.43 Victims of revenge porn may use
different strategies to address this kind of privacy breach. First, they may
initiate private actions seeking damages in tort law or an injunction against
the person who spread the material.44 Second, if there is proof of who took
the photos, victims can turn to copyright infringement.45
Civil recourse often falls short, failing to provide enough incentive to
prevent revenge porn from spreading.46 To address this inefficiency, the ma-
jority of U.S. jurisdictions have criminalized the intentional distribution of
revenge porn, 47 but only a minority of states have comparable civil reme-
dies.48 An important civil remedy is the possibility of obtaining an injunction
to prevent further distribution.49 Even if a victim is successful, however, in




42. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 345, at 345 (2014).
43. Id. at 359.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 359-60.
46. Id. at 357 (arguing for the introduction of criminal penalties to effectively ad-
dress nonconsensual porn).
47. See State Revenge Porn Laws, C.A. GOLDBERG LAW, http://www.cagoldberg
law.com/states-with-revenge-pom-laws/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2016) (reporting
that as of March 20, 2016, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia
have criminalized revenge porn, whereas only nine states have civil remedies
for revenge porn); see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (criminalizing the
intentional distribution of material that was produced "under circumstances in
which the persons agree or understand that the image shall remain private as a
misdemeanor and fineable offense).
48. GOLDBERG LAW, supra note 47.
49. Citron & Franks, supra note 42, at 358-59; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1708.85(d) (allowing specifically for injunctive relief for victims of revenge
porn).
50. Citron & Franks, supra note 42, at 349 (explaining once information reaches
the internet, a downloader of the media can report the document; once informa-
tion is disclosed, the media spreading would require further litigation of subse-
quent posters).
2016] 333
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Aware of the remaining gaps, private companies have attempted to pro-
vide a solution.51 Specifically, search engines, like Google, offer services
akin to the right to be forgotten.52 This is offered to revenge porn victims
who request images not to appear in searches anymore. 53 However, removing
search results from Google does not remove the information from the Web.54
Policymakers face a constant struggle to balance the freedom of expres-
sion with the right of privacy.55 Europe's right to be forgotten is criticized as
a heavy infringement on the right of expression5 6 that provides insufficient
protection of privacy for consensually taken but non-consensually distributed
intimate photographs.57
In a blockchain world, deleting information generally becomes more
complicated than in a centralized system. Some have used this particular
characteristic to create a censor-resistant social media system.58 For example,
Twister is a micro-blog application in the image of Twitter, but Twister relies
on blockchain technology to avoid censorship.59 In such a system, defama-
tory statements could permanently exist with no regulatory means of re-
moval. This distinction between the current centralized system and a
blockchain system may, however, be only minimally consequential, because
in current systems all information can simply be downloaded and dissemi-
nated again, making it still difficult to remove defamation from the internet.
Under current technology, blocking searches offers the only feasible av-
enue to limit this dissemination, but it does not prevent access if the direct
51. Dino Grandoni, Google to Remove 'Revenge Porn' Images From Search Re-
sults, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2015), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/19/
google-to-remove-revenge-pom-images-from-search-results/.
52. Amit Singhal, "Revenge Porn" and Search, GOOGLE Pus. POL'Y BLOG (June
19, 2015), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com.es/2015/06/revenge-porn-
and-search.html.
53. Grandoni, supra note 51.
54. Id.
55. Citron & Franks, supra note 42, at 374-77.
56. Jimmy Wales, the co-founder of Wikipedia, has criticized the EC rule and the
EJC ruling on privacy and right to be forgotten as censorship of history. See,
e.g., Natasha Lomas, Jimmy Wales Blasts Europe's "Right To Be Forgotten"
Ruling As A "Terrible Danger", TECHCRUNCH (June 7, 2014), http://tech
crunch.com/2014/06/07/wales-on-right-to-be-forgotten/; Joe Miller, Wikipedia
Link Hidden By 'Right To Be Forgotten', BBC (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.bbc.
com/news/technology-28640218.
57. Citron & Franks, supra note 42, at 357 (arguing that civil penalties do not
provide a sufficient deterrent for individuals to post these photos).
58. Klint Finley, Out in the Open: An NSA-Proof Twitter, Built with Code from





link is provided.60 Policymakers need to reinvestigate this issue even within
the current state of technology and even more with the advent of blockchain
technology. The next section discusses a different approach with regard to
copyrighted material.
B. Copyright
Copyrighted materials face similar problems when published without
authorization; a copyrighted work of art could be published on a public
blockchain-permanently and unlawfully.61 Once a copyrighted work of art
is recorded on the ledger, it will become virtually impossible to take down
because no central server can be disconnected and the individual cannot be
stopped.62 Further mitigation by injunction would be impossible to enforce,
leaving victims with recovery for damages as their only possible recourse. 63
In order for copyright holders to recover damages, they must decide
from whom to collect.64 Copyright holders already face this question under
the current system, and as copyrighted material is published on blockchains,
holders will turn to one of four entities: the original poster of the copyrighted
material; the Intermediary Service Providers (ISP)65; the public blockchain's
creator; or the subsequent downloaders.66
A copyright holders' first stop ought to be the original infringer.67 Even
if an individual owns the right to enjoy a copyrighted work of art (e.g., a
legally purchased a copy of a movie), uploading the work onto a webhost or
blockchain is unlawful and subjects the individual to liability.68 But these
infringers might often prove judgment-proof in most cases and are not a good
avenue for recovery. If a copyright holder attempts to recover for every
download and for each upload, the original infringer quickly becomes judg-
60. Grandoni, supra note 51.
61. Nick Vogel, Comment, The Great Decentralization: How Web 3.0 Will
Weaken Copyrights, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 135, 148 (2015).
62. Id. at 141.
63. Id. at 148.
64. See id. at 146.
65. Intermediary service providers include internet service providers, web content
hosts, and caching. See Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (b) (2010).
66. Vogel, supra note 61, at 143-47.
67. Id. at 146.
68. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-04 (mandating a copyright can obtain an injunction
against an infringer and request damages); British Acad'y of Songwriters,
Composers and Authors v. Sec'y of State for Bus. Innovation & Skills [2015]
EWHC 1723, Case No: CO/5444/2014 (holding that making a copy for its own
use can also be construed as unlawful copying and lead to liability).
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ment-proof.69 This issue will continue under a blockchain technology record-
ing system.
Second, the copyright holder may decide to go after wealthier entities-
ISPs.70 In Europe and the United States, ISPs face limited liability for in-
ternet content uploaded by their users. In the United States, the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and the Online Copyright Infringement
Liability Limitation Act have become the principle tools for online copyright
enforcement.71 Under these acts, ISPs can face liability for the unlawful dis-
semination of copyrighted material.72 However, the DMCA creates a safe
harbor against liability for internet service providers and webhosts if, "upon
notification of claimed infringement . . , [the ISP] responds expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or
to be the subject of infringing activity."73
In Europe, the EU Copyright Directive74 and the E-Commerce Direc-
tive?5 offer comparable guidelines for the implementation of digital copyright
holder rights and limitations of ISP liability.76 Among other things, a copy-
69. Vogel, supra note 61, at 148.
70. Id. at 144-45.
71. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
[hereinafter DMCA] (codified as amended in sections of 17 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.,
& 35 U.S.C.); Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, 17
U.S.C. § 512 (2010); Ryan Bates, Communication Breakdown: The Recording
Industry's Pursuit of the Individual Music User, a Comparison of U.S. and
E. U. Copyright Protections for Internet Music File Sharing, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 229 (2004).
72. DMCA, supra note 71, § 1203(c).
73. Id. at § 512 (c)(1)(C).
74. Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related
Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167), 10.
75. Directive 2000/31/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular
Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter
E-Commerce Directive].
76. See, e.g., Yaman Akdeniz, To Block or Not to Block: European Approaches to
Content Regulation, and Implications for Freedom of Expression, 26 COMPUT.
L. & SEC. REV. 260 (2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1906712 (comparing the
DCMA and the E-commerce Directive); Bates, supra note 71; Stephen E.
Blythe, The U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the E.U. Copyright
Directive: Comparative Impact on Fair Use Rights, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 111 (2006); Lucie Guibault et al., Study on the Implementation and Ef-
fect in Member States' Laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society,




right holder can file a notice to a webhost and the webhost can avoid liability
if "the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expedi-
tiously to remove or to disable access to the information."77
Recent European court decisions have provided copyright holders an-
other tool in the fight against copyright infringement.78 Even though ISPs can
avoid liability and have no duty to monitor their customers,7 9 copyright hold-
ers can request an injunction to make ISPs block their customers' access to
copyright infringing websites. These types of injunctions can prove useful for
copyright holders if the webhost is not within the court's jurisdiction. How-
ever, more savvy ISP customers have means of circumventing the ISPs
through virtual private networks, proxy servers, onion routing, etc.80
In a blockchain world, webhosting could become decentralized; remov-
ing content from a public chain within one jurisdiction does not affect the
chain in another jurisdiction.81 Blockchain technology undeniably affects the
way copyright holders can use the DMCA and the E-Commerce Directive to
take down copyright-infringing content. Copyright holders may have to file
more injunctions to block access to links rather than having the content re-
moved; nonetheless, going after every ISP, even in a single jurisdiction (e.g.,
Germany), could prove prohibitively complicated and expensive.
Third, copyright holders can attempt to recover from a public
blockchain's creators. In the past, companies that created software that ena-
bled and incited infringement have been held liable for inducing infringe-
ment.82 After a blockchain matures to decentralization, the original software
77. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 75, art. 14.
78. In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that ISPs could be
ordered to block access to websites carrying copyright-infringing materials.
Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih
GmbH, Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH, 2014 E.C.R. I. In 2015, the
Germany Supreme Court ruled and reaffirmed a similar case in Bundesgericht-
shof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 26, 2015, Gesellschaft fir musikal-
ische Auffhlirungs, Case ZR 3/14.
79. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 75, art. 15.
80. See 5 Ways to Bypass Internet Censorship and Filtering, How-To GEEK, http://
www.howtogeek.com/167418/5-ways-to-bypass-internet-censorship-and-filter
ing/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2016).
81. A copyright holder can recover from an ISP if it has knowledge that it is ena-
bling infringement. An ISP may claim they have no knowledge of what their
users post. With blockchain technology, it could become complicated to iden-
tify all the ISP hostings required to prove that each individual ISP had knowl-
edge of the content of the blockchain. For instance, Bitcoin has several
thousand reachable nodes hosting and validating exact replicas of its
blockchain. See GLOBAL BrTCoIN NODES, https://bitnodes.21.co (last visited
Nov. 10, 2016).
82. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919
(2005) ("hold[ing] that one who distributes a device with the object of promot-
2016] 337
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
creators remain the only "centralized" avenue of damage recovery when un-
authorized material is appended to the blockchain. In some situations, this
recovery avenue will fail because public blockchains, like Bitcoin's, are usu-
ally created and developed as an open source project, allowing the creators
and developers to remain anonymous. 8 3 And even if known, the software
designers may not even profit from their creation, making them judgment-
proof.
Finally, copyright holders can attempt to recover from the subsequent
infringers-individuals who downloaded their work unlawfully. The copy-
right holder needs to find creative ways to defeat the numerosity of infring-
ers; a copyright holder would need to identify a large number of individuals,
each liable for a small amount, and sue them, possibly collectively, in order
to take advantage of economies of scale.
For instance, in Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does,84 a film producing com-
pany filed a suit against thousands of infringers over a copyrighted film. As
part of the case, the company filed subpoenas with ISPs to obtain user
records.85 The company later dismissed the case but showed how identifying
users can be used to recover damages. Some companies specialize in tracking
infringement and enforcing copyrighted works.86
In a blockchain, identifying infringers can prove difficult because the
cryptography associated with most blockchain protocol masks identities and
IP addresses; nonetheless, anonymity in a public chain may only be superflu-
ous. Researchers have showed how to use data publicly published on a
blockchain in order to track individuals as well as their activities, accounts,
and other information.87
In other words, based on current technology, copyright enforcement is
already complicated and often unfruitful. Retrofitting current regulation to
ing its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirma-
tive steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties").
83. For example, Bitcoin's creator, the pseudonymous Satoshi Nakomoto, remains
unmasked. Emin Gun Sirer, How to Spot Bitcoin Inventor Satoshi Nakamoto,
MIT TECH. REv. (Dec. 10, 2015) https://www.technologyreview.com/s/
54443 1/how-to-spot-bitcoin-inventor-satoshi-nakamoto/.
84. 818 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2011).
85. Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, an Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1105,
1115 (2015).
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Malte M6ser, Anonymity of Bitcoin-Transactions: An Analysis of
Mixing Services (July, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.wi.uni-
muenster.de/sites/wi/files/public/department/itsecurity/mbcI 3/mbc13-moeser-
paper.pdf; see also Fergal Reid & Martin Harrigan, An Analysis of Anonymity
in the Bitcoin System, in SEC. AND PRIVACY IN Soc. NETWORKS 197 (Yaniv
Altshuler et al. eds. 2013), https://arxiv.org/pdf/l 107.4524.pdf.
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blockchain technology could provide some temporary relief. But policymak-
ers may face the need to readdress the DMCA and E-Commerce Directive in
the near future in order to find a more suitable solution. Copyright holders
may also find a way within blockchain technology to better enforce their
rights.88
This section focused on the private incentives of private individuals to
censor information about themselves or their intellectual creations. The gov-
ernment may also wish to censor a wide variety of other types of information
(e.g., child pornography, terrorist propaganda, etc.), and blockchains may
make this censorship far more difficult.
While the incentives differ, the conversations and conclusions remain
valid; the permanency of a blockchain creates problems. The decentralized
nature of blockchains could also create additional problems that will require
revisiting: since all the nodes in a public blockchain carry the same informa-
tion, if unlawful information has been uploaded and if possession of the in-
formation exposes the node owner to liability (e.g., "owning" child
pornography), a public blockchain could, theoretically, expose all node own-
ers to liability (criminal and civil).89
Arguably, node owners could avoid liability by being classified as an
ISP; clarification may, therefore, be necessary in view of this new technology
with particular emphasis on how much control over a server is necessary to
create liability. Alternatively, server owners can avoid having unwanted in-
formation by controlling who can write the information on their servers. The
next section investigates such a server system; a private network. Specifi-
cally, the next two sections investigate how governments can use private
blockchain for record keeping.
III. PRIVATE GOVERNMENTAL BLOCKCHAINS CURRENTLY
INCREASE RECORD-KEEPING COSTS WITHOUT
OFFERING SUFFICIENT BENEFITS
A blockchain where only authorized individuals have access to the re-
corded information resembles most private networks or Internet sites where
88. In the blockchain, the music/movie industry can find a solution: blockchain
technology makes very small-valued transactions more affordable. Copyright
holders could make their digital art freely available, but with embed codes that
meter usage and charge (very small amounts) accordingly. Similarly, newspa-
pers may switch to a freemium basis. See Laura Shin, Hate Online Ads? A New
Product Offers An Alternative: Micropayments, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2016), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2016/02/09/hate-online-ads-a-new-product-of
fers-an-alternative-micropayments/.
89. This issue already exists when looking at cloud technology. See, e.g., Audrey
Rodgers, From Peer-to-Peer Networks to Cloud Computing: How Technology
is Redefining Child Pornography Laws, 87 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1013, 1045
(2013) (discussing the question of who possesses the child pornography in a
cloud computing system).
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information access requires credential input. While this type of blockchain
creates similar issues, such as privacy and copyright infringement, these
blockchains also present a possible opportunity for policymakers; govern-
ments could benefit from implementing private blockchain technologies for
their record keeping. This section discusses the policy issues presented by a
private access blockchain where only authorized individuals can read and
write to the blockchain.
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environmental Impact of
Blockchains
Concerns have been raised about both the cost to switch to a blockchain
system and its environmental impact. These two issues usually go hand-in-
hand to some extent, but not always, as is proven by Bitcoin.
Policymakers have looked at blockchain technology and how to effi-
ciently implement it. For instance, the state of Vermont investigated the up-
sides and downsides of the technology.90 Vermont researchers performed a
cost-benefit analysis of a switch to a blockchain recording system. The state
concluded that the current technological cost of switching to a blockchain did
not outweigh the added security it provided.9 1
In the case of Bitcoin, the system costs are shared between all the node
owners since each must purchase its own equipment to maintain the node.92
Nakamoto originally envisioned that all nodes would also be "miners," but
this is not a requirement; the functions can be separated. 93 Many nodes
merely validate blocks and distribute the blockchain among other nodes; this
is relatively inexpensive.94 On the other hand, some nodes-"miners"-com-
pete with each other to obtain a reward for "finding" a block.95 The reward
for finding a block is newly minted bitcoins, distributed only when there is
consensus among the nodes that the miner has found the block.96 Mining
nodes find blocks by computing random numbers against selected transac-
tions (hashes) until a solution is found to a complex math problem that can
90. See JAMES CONDOS ET AL., BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY: OPPORTUNITIES AND
RISKS Ch. 5 (2016) (discussing the cost involved in setting up a mining center
in order to process bitcoin data and profit).
91. "[T]he benefits of adoption of blockchain technology by state agencies is, at
this time, not outweighed by the costs and challenges of such implementation."
Id. at 20.
92. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 2, at 3.
93. See id. ("Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block.).
94. Simon Barber et al., Bitter to Better How to Make Bitcoin a Better Currency,
FIN. CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SEC. 399, 401 (2012) ("Bitcoin nodes can be
divided into broadly two classes, verifiers and clients.").
95. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 2, at 4.
96. See id. at 3-4.
[Vol. XIX340
Blockchain Technology
only be solved by trial and error.97 This trial and error method of problem
solving requires astronomical amounts of computations, i.e. computer
work.98 Accordingly, the provision of a solution is "proof-of-work."99 All the
transactions used in finding the solution make up the next "block" of transac-
tions in the blockchain.100 This required work from miners is what secures
the bitcoin blockchain, and the reward, along with transaction fees, is what
incentivizes mining node owners to dedicate resources to doing this.I0 Be-
cause there is only one reward given per block (rather than being distributed
among all miners) an arms race type scenario where mining node operators
are continually adding more and faster equipment to be the first to find a
block.102 In order to assure block solutions are found at an average of ten
minutes, the network periodically adjusts the difficulty of finding a solu-
tion.103 This is designed to regulate the supply of bitcoins, but it also perpetu-
ates the arms race scenario.104 For this reason, the equipment and electricity
costs required to profitably mine bitcoins is already enormous and ever
increasing.05
For a private blockchain to emulate Bitcoin's, its system must also in-
clude encryption and redundancy of checking the information.106 Without
these redundancies, it would simply amount to an encrypted centralized sys-
tem. 0 7 In other words, these processes create an even larger need for hard-
ware, because instead of having one centralized center (and a backup), a
blockchain requires a distributed system with multiple hardware centers. 08
But these redundancies are present in Bitcoin in order to verify and validate
transactions without the need of a trusted party. In a private blockchain,
trusted parties are necessarily present. Accordingly, in a private blockchain,
the redundancies may add no utility over current centralized systems; rather,
they only encumber the system.
97. See id. at 3.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 5.
100. See id. at 3.
101. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 2, at 3.
102. Morgan E. Peck, The Bitcoin Arms Race Is On!, IEEE SPECTRUM (May 6,
2013), http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/networks/the-bitcoin-arms-race-is-
on.
103. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 2, at 3-4.
104. See Peck, supra note 102.
105. ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES
131 (2016).
106. See Condos et al., supra note 90, at 6-7.
107. See id. at 7.
108. See id.
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The fixed cost of implementing a blockchain may not be the largest
roadblock. The energy consumption associated with a blockchain and its re-
dundancy can accumulate quickly.109 In its current Bitcoin implementation,
no single entity carries the costs of running a blockchain ledger, thus it is
quite difficult to estimate its true costs."i0 Nonetheless, the range of estima-
tions show that maintaining the Bitcoin blockchain is very costly.", For ex-
ample, the Bitcoin blockchain can require as much energy as a small town of
150,000 habitants to a country of 10 million habitants depending on the effi-
ciencies of the machines that store and process the ledger.112
A private, government controlled blockchain may not require a network
as large as Bitcoin and could be cheaper to run. 13 Nevertheless, due to the
redundancies of a blockchain system, it would be more costly to operate than
the current centralized system.11 4 Furthermore, switching all recording sys-
tems to a blockchain and scaling them to the level required to serve large
populations could become quite expensive and damaging to the
environment. 115
Even though proponents would argue that a governmental blockchain
would be more efficient or the heat created by the blockchain could be re-
cycled,116 a blockchain system would remain more environmentally demand-
ing than the current centralized system. 117 In a post-COP21 world,118 energy
consumption may become a priority for policymakers."9 Within the current
state of computing power and energy consumption, policymakers may find it
difficult to argue in favor of a private blockchain for public records. Because




113. See DELOITTE LLP, BLOCKCHAIN ENIGMA. PARADOX. OPPORTUNITY (2016),
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/Innovation/de
loitte-uk-blockchain-full-report.pdf.
114. Id. at 11.
115. The Great Chain, supra note 19.
116. Condos et al., supra note 90.
117. The Great Chain, supra note 19.
118. Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/cli
mate-change-accord-paris.html. COP21 was the twenty-first annual session of
the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) that concluded on December 12, 2015. COP21
resulted in a global agreement on the reduction of climate change. See UN
Climate Change Conference Paris 2015, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/




the redundancy serves little purpose in a private blockchain (which is not
trustless), it may be more reasonable to simply continue using centralized
databases for most government recordkeeping.
B. Trusting the Gatekeeper
In their report, Vermont policymakers identified one glaring downside
to the blockchain: the technology does not guarantee content accuracy.1 20
Even if a blockchain is used to keep public records, the secured information
will only be as good as the human entering the information.121 Vermont's
original application protocol, however, relied on multiple human inputs in
order to assure accuracy: multiple individuals agree to the transaction and the
algorithm only verifies and transfers the funds.122 The permanency of a
blockchain can make record-keeping more complicated than the current sys-
tem 23 because multiple trusted individuals would be required to assure the
accuracy of permanent entries.124 And the use of trusted individuals seem-
ingly undermines the primary purpose of blockchain technology, which is to
make an accurate and publicly accessible immutable record of transactions
without the need for concentrating trust in third parties in order for individu-
als to conduct and publicly record such transactions.125
Furthermore, blockchains make correcting mistakes difficult because
transactions are not reversible.126 Blockchain technology was created to al-
low individuals who do not know or trust each other to transact together
online without the need for a trusted intermediary. 127 Irreversibility ensures
the reliability of transactions.128 Accordingly, reversing blockchain transac-
tions in order to correct mistakes defeats the purpose and design of the tech-
nology, which is why correcting mistaken entries is prohibitively difficult.
Hypothetically, a government could deploy a blockchain to maintain
public real estate records.1 29 Under such a system, a property purchaser could
record the deed from the seller by going down to city hall, no differently than
120. Condos et al., supra note 90, at 19-20.
121. Id. at 20.
122. Anton I. Badev & Matthew Chen, Bitcoin: Technical Background and Data
Analysis, Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. Fin, and Econ. Discussion
Series, 11-12, (2014) (unpublished working paper).
123. Id. at 12.
124. Id.




129. See generally Barber et al., supra note 94, at 401 (discussing how this can
already occur within small bitcoin transactions).
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is currently done.1so But if the transaction is recorded on a blockchain, if the
human entering the transaction makes a mistake, and the buyer does not no-
tice it, the property owner may lose the right to the property or face a lengthy
legal battle.131 In other words, a blockchain algorithm checks that the transac-
tion can occur, but it does not check its content for accuracy. For a real estate
transaction,132 it could ensure that the seller can sell, but it does not ensure
that the "correct" buyer receives the title.
Potential risks with land titles already exist and these risks have led to
the creation of the title insurance market.133 Switching to a blockchain would
raise similar issues and continue the need for such risk absorbing busi-
nesses.1 34 However, because blockchains timestamp any changes, if a mis-
130. Blockchain systems could provide for an opportunity to standardize recording
methods across U.S. states and EU member states. See generally Tanya D.
Marsh, Foreclosures and the Failure of the American Land Title Recording
System, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (2011) (discussing the need for a standardiza-
tion of land recording across the United States and need to the move to a com-
puter based system that would facilitate searches); De Filippi, supra note 6
(discussing possible applications of the blockchain technology including smart
property that can be transferred within a few click thanks to their registration
on a blockchain).
131. If the property is misattributed, the rightful owner would need to enjoin the
misattributed owner through a court system to transfer the property to him. Any
court intervention increases inefficiencies.
132. Land mapping and ownership recording has been one of the first non-financial
blockchain application. Honduras and Greek politicians have expressed interest
in using a form a Blockchain ledger to keep track of property ownership. See
The Trust Machine, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.economist.
com/news/leaders/21677198-technology-behind-bitcoin-could-transform-how-
economy-works-trust-machine. A pilot of the Honduras project has allegedly
provided positive results, but the project also seems to have stalled beyond
these initial results. See Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, Honduras to Build Land
Title Registry Using Bitcoin Technology, REUTERS (May 14, 2015), http://
www.reuters.com/article/usa-honduras-technology-idINKBNOOO1V7201505
15; Peter Kirby, A Humble Update on the Honduras Title Project, FATCOM
(Dec. 24, 2015) https:/factom.com/blog/a-humble-update-on-the-honduras-title
-project. An on-going project in Ghana is also mapping out all the property
through a blockchain registry. Falila Gbadamassi, Le Blockchain, La Techno-
logie Qui Pourrait Donner Vie a Des Cadastres Virtuels, FRANCE TV INFO.
(Feb. 9, 2016) http://geopolis.francetvinfo.fr/le-blockchain-la-technologie-qui-
pourrait-donner-vie-a-des-cadastres-virtuels-95941.
133. See generally Jean-Bernard Wurm, How US-style Title Insurance is Transform-
ing Risk Management in European Real Estate Markets, 20 HOUSING FIN.
INT'L 16 (2006) (noting that title insurance protect against defective titles
linked to "include a gap in the chain of recorded ownership, missing documents
or invalid signatures" and that Europe has adopted U.S. title insurances).
134. See generally Condos et al., supra note 90, at 9-10.
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take occurs then the mistake's origin (input date, time, identity) can be traced
more easily than traditional system.1 35 This idiosyncrasy could ease the evi-
dentiary issues with identifying mistakes and accelerate redressing proceed-
ings.136 Additionally, it can help restore records after cyber-attacks because
the record could be returned to any point in time before it was changed.137
Alternatively, the Bitcoin protocol also enables some embedded
software write-around to ensure the correct distribution of coins: its
blockchain allows for "smart contracts" or software enforced contracts where
a transaction occurs when some conditions are fulfilled.138 A recordkeeping
blockchain could use a similar "escrow" system where the recording is put
on hold by the recorder until an interested party checks its content or time
passes.1 39 For instance, a birth recording could be inputted at the registry
office and put in "escrow" until a parent checks the content of the registry
and triggers the record permanency.
This section argues that the current computing power and protocol do
not rationally support the switching of public records to a blockchain system.
The marginal benefits cannot justify the costs of switching technology. The
next section investigates how blockchain systems would benefit governments
by providing transparency and legitimacy.
IV. GOVERNMENTS CAN ADVANCE TRANSPARENCY
AND LEGITIMACY GOALS WITH BLOCKCHAIN
RECORD KEEPING
While the previous sections discuss the drawbacks of blockchain tech-
nology, this section supports its adoption. The discussion in section II fo-
cused on a complete public blockchain and how policymakers need to adapt
to the demand of this technology to combat old foes. The discussion in sec-
tion 1I focused on governmental records where the records in question were
only writable and accessible to governmental employees; however, this need
not be the case. This section investigates the upside of adopting a different
kind of blockchain: (i) a blockchain where only governmental entities can
write but all can read and (ii) a blockchain where only governmental entities
can read but all can write.
A. Transparency
Policymakers can implement many different types of blockchains de-
pending on who can write and who can read the information on the ledger. A
blockchain with private access for writing and public access for reading en-
135. See generally id.
136. See generally id.
137. See generally id.
138. See, e.g., De Filippi, supra note 6, at 10-11.
139. See id. at n.52.
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sures that only individuals with permission can write on it, and as such, un-
wanted information cannot find its way onto the chain. In general, because
governmental records need to be trusted, they often fall into this category and
leave individuals with rare opportunities to change their own records for
things even as simple as an address change.
Over the years, policymakers have encouraged more transparency as a
means to provide more accountability. For instance, the United States' Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA) requires that federal agencies and depart-
ments provide public information upon request without undue delays.140 The
European Commission also has a similar legislation.141
Despite the legislatures' good intentions, these types of legislation often
fail to fulfill their goals. First, the information requests are resource inten-
sive: they require government employees who do not specialize in answering
these kinds of requests to decide what information should or should not be
disclosed.142 While court decisions have offered some guidelines,143 new is-
sues constantly arise. Second, since they are so resource intensive, FOIA
requests waste government resources and involve potentially large delays,
depending on the nature of the information.144
Making public records fully accessible in a blockchain could improve
transparency while also addressing some of the aforementioned shortcomings
of lawmakers. Moving public records to a blockchain could remove delays
because it would circumvent the need for FOIA requests. Public access for
reading need not breach individual privacy: a well-designed system ensures
anonymity and saves the government from expending substantial resources in
collecting and recording each document multiple times for individual govern-
140. See generally Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
Several states have equivalent acts. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-200 to
259 (2015); D.C. CODE §§ 2-531 to 540 (2015); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-3704
to 3714 (2016).
141. "Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having
its registered office in a Member State, has a right of access to European Parlia-
ment, Council and Commission documents." Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union art. 42, 2000 0.J. C 364/01, at 19.
142. FOIA requests have a list of exemptions and among them, trade secrets, com-
mercial or financial information, confidential information, etc. See Dep't of
Justice, Guide to the Freedom of Information Act (2015), https://www.justice.
gov/oip/doj-guide-freedom-information-act-0.
143. Id. All the explanations are accompanied by court decision supporting inclu-
sion and exclusion of information. See id.
144. The Department of Justice reported that for 2015, its average number of days of
delay was 30 days for simple requests and 174 days for complex requests,
whereas the Department of State reported 111 days and 511 respectively, re-
spectively, for the same year. See Annual FOIA Reports, DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/oip/annual-foia-reports-fy-2015 (last visited Nov. 10,
2016) (Separate agency reports are found within the page).
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mental agency; these documents could be recorded automatically with an
appended version where the predesigned forms already hide the sensitive
information.145
In 2016, the government of the United Kingdom (U.K.) published a re-
port in favor of implementing this technology for specific cases.1 46 Among
the potential applications laid out in that report, the U.K. Chief Scientific
Adviser discussed how to apply blockchain to pensions, foreign aid, and gen-
eral governmental expenditures. 147 The governmental entities can write all of
their expenses on a public ledger and the ledger could be available for all to
see. These measures would encourage transparency and accountability be-
cause any fraud could be fully observed by the public and the press.
B. Legitimacy I
This section discusses the upside of having blockchains with public ac-
cess for writing and private access for reading. These types of ledgers may be
even more rare than those discussed in the previous section. In general, infor-
mation on the distributed ledger remains encrypted; thus, unless the informa-
tion writer wishes, the information cannot be publicly accessed even if it is
completely decentralized.
This type of blockchain could become central to e-voting. For instance,
a system could be created where each voter has a private key that they can
use to vote on a public ledger (which guarantees single entryl4 8) and only the
individuals running the chain can access the results (that can only be read in
an aggregated manner to ensure anonymityl49). Various implementations
have been put forward to this effect.150
Policymakers would gain more legitimacy by using these kinds of incor-
ruptible ledgers. Any changes in the ledger would be recorded, and any fraud
145. A large portion of governmental data comes 'from information collected in
forms. A system could be designed to have the redacting occur ex-ante: on each
form, individual boxes could be marked publicly visible or not.
146. See generally Mark Walport, Distributed Ledger Technology: Beyond Block
Chain, U.K. Gov'T OFF. FOR SCI. (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/govem
ment/publications/distributed-ledger-technology-blackett-review.
147. Id. at 68-71.
148. The Bitcoin protocol was designed to prevent double spending of Bitcoins.
Similarly, a blockchain used for voting would prevent the possibility of double
voting. Once a vote has been cast, the blockchain appending protocol would
deny attempts to cast additional votes using the same blockchain token. See
NAKAMOTO, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing the prevention of double spending
with through the use of a "proof-of-work" mining algorithm).
149. See id. at 6.
150. See, e.g., Guy Zyskind et al., Decentralizing Privacy: Using Blockchain to Pro-
tect Personal Data, 2015 IEEE COMPUTER Soc'Y SEC. AND PRIVACY WORK-
SHOPS 180, 183 (2015).
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would be observed and traceable to whomever entered the fraudulent entries:
blockchains need not rely on the honesty of the implementer but instead on
mathematic accuracy to ensure every single vote is casted by the live voting
population.
First, this kind of e-voting would avoid issues of hanging chads.151 It
would remove ambiguity about the intent of the voters when casting ballots
in some jurisdictions. For example, the 2000 U.S. presidential election exem-
plifies how a system can fail, removing a candidate's aura of legitimacy.
During these elections, counting issues arose because of the uncertainties
about the vote casting and these issues lead to delays; this ultimately required
the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene.152 The courts' involvements have ar-
guably tainted the elections.153 Relying on a foolproof blockchain could re-
dress some of these issues and reestablish voters' faith in the system.
Second, switching to secured blockchain e-voting could increase legiti-
macy. Voters could cast their votes from smartphones or home computers, or
still go to a public election booth, and these votes would be recorded on a
secured blockchain. Easier means of voting could help voter turnout, increase
the feeling of democracy, and bestow any elected candidate with more
legitimacy.
Finally, blockchain technology could be used to avoid fraudulent voting.
For example, blockchain e-voting could avoid ghost voting fraud. Ghost vot-
ing is the practice of voting for individuals who are not present or do not
exist.154 A smart blockchain could contain a protocol automatically to check
birth and death registries.155 A smart blockchain could also record the loca-
tion of individuals when they vote through their phone's GPS, computer IP
address, or voting booth.
151. See Frederick G. Conrad et al., Electronic Voting Eliminates Hanging Chads
but Introduces New Usability Challenges, 67 INT'L J. HUMAN-COMPUTER
STUD. 111 (2009) (arguing in favor of e-voting, but also recommending a better
interface).
152. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
153. Adam Cohen, Has Bush v. Gore Become the Case That Must Not Be Named?,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/15/opinion/15
tues4.html (arguing that "Bush v. Gore was not a legal decision but a raw
assertion of power").
154. Brian Kim, Help America Vote Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 579, 599 (2003).
155. While its name has been associated with voter fraud, ghost voting also occurs
at the legislative level. Ghost voting in parliamentary chambers has recently
raised problems on both sides of the Atlantic. See In European Parliament,
Probe Into Ghost Voting for Far-right's Le Pen, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Oct. 30,
2015), http://www.dw.comlen/in-european-parliament-probe-into-ghost-voting-
for-far-rights-le-pen/a-18816733; George Spencer, NBC1O Investigators Un-






In general, while considering a switch to blockchain technology, policy-
makers need to reinvestigate a number of laws and rights. Privacy rights and
copyrights have suffered in the Internet age, and blockchain technology may
not ease this issue, even if it was created with privacy in mind.
Government may not find the need to switch to a blockchain technology
for record keeping just yet. Its implementation involves switching and varia-
ble costs that are not justified by the marginal improvement in record keep-
ing; nonetheless, the policy and political push for more transparency could
prove to be the deciding factor.
This article does not directly address the financial sector. The
blockchain applications to this sector open a host of new questions for
policymakers, and policymakers may need to address financial regulation in
the view of blockchain technology becoming more mainstream in financial
markets. Bitcoin and other virtual currencies have been categorized as the
currency of criminals, and Silk Road has been used as the prime example of
how Bitcoin can be used in nefarious ways. 156
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financial measures have
become a talking point for policymakers. As recently as June 2015, the Euro-
pean Parliament has passed a new regulation and amended a directive to
address money laundering.i57 These new legislations increase the "Know-
Your-Customer" requirements for payment service providers.158 The direc-
tive and regulation are broad enough to include digital instruments, but they
focus on third-party intermediaries and their duties.159 As such, a decentral-
ized currency system based on blockchain technology could still avoid this
regulation because no payment service provider exists per se. However,
156. Jared A. Kleiman, Beyond the Silk Road: Unregulated Decentralized Virtual
Currencies Continue to Endanger US National Security and Welfare, 4 NAT'L
SEc. L. BRIEF 59, 60 (2013), http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/nslb/
vol4/issl/5/.
157. Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
May 2015 on information accompanying transfers of funds and repealing Reg-
ulation (EC) No 1781/2006, 2015 O.J. (L 141/1) [hereinafter Council Regula-
tion 2015/847 (EU)]; Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial
system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council,
and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, 2015 O.J. (L 141/73) [herein-
after Council Directive 2015/849 (EU)].
158. See Council Regulation 2015/847 (EU), supra note 157; Council Directive
2015/849 (EU), supra note 157.
159. See id.
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policymakers may decide to target what the IMF describes as "gatekeepers"
or virtual currency intermediaries.160
Even though the system is decentralized, some chokepoints remain: the
currency exchanges, the currency holding service providers, etc. Some of
these services could already qualify for regulation. For instance, a currency
holding apparatus (known as virtual wallet) could be considered a deposit,
and the wallet providers could be considered banks for the purpose of the
regulation; nonetheless, most of these chokepoints fall outside current regula-
tion, and need not keep nor provide a record of their transactions to the au-
thorities.161 The lack of accountability to a policing authority leaves users
exposed to attacks without potential remedies and allows potential transfers
that finance criminal activities.
From identity recording to wills and testaments,1 62 blockchain technol-
ogy has untapped potential, and entrepreneurs continue finding new applica-
tions that will require the participation of policymakers for proper
implementation.
160. He et al., supra note 9.
161. For example, governments like the Isle of Man have recognized these issues
and implemented measures in the form of a regulatory framework where
cryptocurrency exchanges must register and abide by the island's anti-money
laundering and know-your-customer requirements. Jeremy Khan, Greetings
From Bitcoin Island: No Place on the Planet Has Welcomed Digital Curren-
cies as Warmly as the Isle of Man, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-09-07/isle-of-man-tax-haven-with-tailless-
cats-becomes-bitcoin-hub. The issue remains the same if the exchange is not
. located on the island.
162. A blockchain system could be applied to property transfers. Wills and testa-
ments are a specific form of property transfer: a property transfer triggered by
the death of the original interest holder. Wills recorded in a blockchain have
one major upside-they are timestamped. A constant recording of all wills and
the time-stamping of all wills would reduce disputes over the validity a pur-
ported will. In other words, the blockchain can carry out the function of a
trustless and always accurate notary to prove the time of the document's exis-
tence, not necessarily that it represents the true will of the deceased. See Trevor
I. Kiviat, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions, 65
DUKE L.J. 569 (2015). Beyond the recording of wills upon a blockchain ledger,
smart wills could involve the automated transfer of a smart property upon the
death of its owner when the ledger automatically checks the death registry and
finds that the writer of the will passed away. Instead of relying on human input,
the algorithm can find and retrieve the information from other records. Trans-
fers could include land titles and currency already registered in a blockchain.
Trusts could be automated as well. For instance, an inheritance could automati-
cally divest when the beneficiary turns 18, gets married, has children, etc.
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